This is not investment advice and is general in nature. Do your own research before taking any positions in the securities listed below
A reminder of their Earnings "miss" in mid October (and potentially more to come)
A bit over a month ago, $BBN reported their profit miss & a 21% share price fall ensued. As with most downgrades, these things rarely occur solely once but as the company starts to trade on a 16x forward P/E (vs. 5yr-average of 20x) it starts to get compelling
The profit miss was due to a drop-off in margins
o Domestic freight charges: 70 bps (Transitory)
o FX: 20bps (from a softer A$) - (Transitory)
o Playgear sales mix: 60bps vs. Peak Lockdown (Possibly Permanent)
o Loyalty - 60bp impact vs expectations (Possibly Permanent)
Great business but CODB burden is not ideal
You don't need to know the discretionary retail/eComm market to appreciate that there is a huge amount of costs that run between GM% and NPAT%. For example, Dusk/Lovisa may make 70% GM but only mid-teen NPAT margins. Conversely - $BBN makes c.40% margin & 4% NPAT margins.
With such wafer-thin margins, let me explain why I think operating leverage can improve
Warehousing costs & NZ set-up costs weighed on CODB so I envisage that CODB growth will be lower in 2023
Accounting adjustments (lease and depreciation treatment) weigh down their NPAT vs. their cash flows
Structurally I am less optimistic about retail companies in Australia because I do not think it is unlikely that consumers will stray from shopping at Kmart/Target/Big W too much. However, I think for 'baby' purchases, the downside of buying poorly is so large (a screaming baby namely) that
people will at least go to their retail sites to inspect the bulkier purchases (cots, prams, car seats, bouncers etc)
Brand loyalty is militant for baby stuff; so the more exclusivity $BBN can obtain the better GM%
In short - I do genuinely think that the "bricks & mortar" play for baby products still makes sense.This is evident because c.20% $BBN’s sales are made online, however, at least half of those sales are completed in-store (e.g. you buy the car seat online but get it fitted in-store).
Ok, so what are the reasons to be bearish though?
Insider selling: Long-standing & impressive CEO (Matthew Spencer) has offloaded c.$3.7m of stock in the last 12 months (et levels which are double where the stock sits today). Spencer had good timing on the KMD brands IPO which still sits below IPO price; so perhaps he's timed his sale well this time
Big ticket products are still competitive: $BBN has rolled out "Everyday low pricing" (or EDLP). Items that fall into this bucket are not just your toys & swaddles. They are primarily the high-ticket, low-frequency purchases such as prams/cots that expectant parents have the time and the motivation to shop around for, transacting where they see the best value. BBN cannot, in our view, afford to be "out of the money" on these products.
International expansion limited here: Whilst NZ expansion has started, it is unlikely they will move to be a truly global player like Lovisa.
That being said; with a store count of only 60 stores, there is plenty of scope for growth domestically
Admin costs & Inventory are excessive: Two areas where costs seem excessive are:
Admin cost growth next year is a lot (+$2m head office increase and $1.5m of NZ HQ costs)
Inventory turnover is 5x which is so-so amongst retailers
Aus population growth is slower than elsewhere: Minor one but ABSs estimates births of ~307k p.a., which whilst decent, is only projected to double in 40yrs (i.e. <2% CAGR)
So where do I start valuing this business
The easiest ways for retail businesses to be undervalued is either 1) when a large % of the stores are immature and you capture margin expansion simply by the store footprint maturing or 2) where they can decrease occupancy costs via a warehouse or DTC approach
$BBN store count is largely mature but immature ones under-earn ALOT
Here is an example of what I mean; new store revenue was particularly weak and will likely revert closer to $8m/store (almost double) in 3yrs time. In $BBN case; immature store count is still quite low but
Reducing Occupancy costs (& Marketing costs) will be the way to higher GM%
Occupancy have increased 9% from 2018 to 2022 whilst warehousing costs have increase 25%. Appreciating this is largely due to one-off items, this could dramatically improve its cash conversion cycle.
To give you an example:
Each store current holds $1.5m of inventory; if increased warehousing could reduce inventory/sales to <17% (historical average) from current level (>19%) it would meaningful improve cash conversion
Overall if NWC/Sales of 6% (e.g. in-line with Adairs) vs. >9%; this could add meaningful upside to cash flows
Valuation - There is some upside today; but I envisage there will be more
In terms of valuing $BBN I have assumed the following
Store count growing from 64 in 2022 to 85 in 2025 (partly due to NZ)
LFL Sales - Historically c.6% to c.3% going forward
GM Margin of 37%
NPAT Margin of 5% (or a 9% EBITDA Margin after AASB 16)
Capex 1.5% of sales / NWC of 8.5% of sales
So overall - you can see there is modest upside in $BBN today. However, I think the catalyst will be that any of the following take place:
Further store roll-out at >$5m sales p.a. per new store (or at least bigger warehouse presence)
Cutting NWC requirement down to <8% sales via better inventory management
Revitalisation of Loyalty program; which will support EBITDA margins
Senior management actually buying stock not offloading it
I do not see any of the above improbable, however, for now it will remain a small holding (<10%).
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